A month into the Russian invasion of Ukraine and it’s become abundantly clear that Russia will continue to rely upon siege-like tactics to wear down the Ukrainian urban defenders. Mariupol and Kharkiv have been under relentless bombardment for weeks. Russian forces have attacked with complete disregard for the safety and welfare of the civilian population in a manner indicative of potential war crimes, driving the United Nations to call for an immediate ceasefire. Desperate calls to protect the remaining 100,000 civilians trapped in the city of Mariupol and enable humanitarian corridors to be established have been met with only partial success. It’s reminiscent of the siege-like tactics imposed throughout the Russian conflict in Chechnya and Syria’s ongoing civil war.
The similarities between the Russian sieges in Ukraine and the Russian-enabled siege of Aleppo are striking. Between July 2012 and December 2016, the people of Aleppo endured constant and indiscriminate shelling in the regime’s fight against Syrian opposition forces. In September 2015, Russia entered the war in support of President Bashar al-Assad, ramping up the scale of the air campaign and besieging the city. The hostilities destroyed the city, starved its people and forced the few thousand remaining Syrian defenders to seek a negotiated ceasefire on the regime’s terms.
The Syrian negotiations revealed Putin as an expert in orchestrating such discussions. Russian airpower hammered the opposition in Aleppo into submission. Rebel forces sought a negotiated ceasefire upon the full realisation that the Syrian regime could continue the air campaign far longer than the rebels could hold out. It was an inevitable result of a brutal strategic plan coordinated and engineered by Putin for mutual benefit. He had not only military power but political power too. To Assad, Putin was the ultimate bro.
Putin’s support for Assad paid dividends for Russia: it enabled leverage over Syrian resources, significant influence in the region and a concourse to counter the United States, albeit it through proxies. It did not, however, earn Putin any notable friends in the political playground, a fact that’s become increasingly apparent in the ongoing attempts to induce negotiations between both Russia and Ukraine. There, Putin is without a true ally, either militarily or diplomatically. Assad is not returning the favour. He’s got bigger problems with the Syrian civil conflict now in its eleventh year. President Xi Jinping may still be entertaining the idea of supplying arms to Russia but that would not support diplomatic, trade or other relations for China globally. While Xi is arguably well positioned to play the mediator between Russia and the Ukraine, so far he has not volunteered.
On the European front, French President Emmanuel Macron has maintained an open line of communication with Putin for many months but Macron represents the West in Putin’s eyes. Then there’s Putin’s best mate, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Unsurprisingly however, Lukashenko is an unsuitable candidate to facilitate negotiations. Although he’s an intransigent supporter of Putin, he lacks diplomatic credibility given his authoritarian government’s appalling human rights record. The United States recently reimposed sanctions on Lukashenko, citing his open support and facilitation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Finally, there’s Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although Turkey is a NATO member state, it has maintained a close relationship with Russia over the years, which deepened with Turkey’s role facilitating negotiations alongside Russia in the Syrian conflict. Furthermore, the relationship between Turkey and the West, including its membership in NATO, has always been volatile. This likely keeps Turkey closer to Russia than may otherwise be the case. Turkey also maintains relations with Ukraine, giving Ankara the ability to engage both sides in discussion over the terms of a potential agreement.
Turkey is in a strong diplomatic position to step up and encourage Putin to reach an agreement that de-escalates the situation. Less than two weeks ago, Putin engaged with the Turkish president and outlined his demands for a ceasefire. These included, amongst others, the expected commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO, an agreement to a process of disarmament as well as the anticipated yet highly contentious territorial demands.
Although not willing to cede Ukrainian territory, Zelensky has indicated his government is prepared to consider adopting a neutral status in any peace deal with Russia. Nonetheless, any agreement will require skilled diplomacy to ensure Putin remains satisfied. If not, he will double down and escalate the conflict with additional nuclear and chemical threats, further bombardments and the deployment of both foreign trained fighters and state-sponsored mercenaries. It is imperative that any agreement between Ukraine and Russia is negotiated in good faith, with both sides adequately supported.
Everyone needs someone in their corner, particularly when they’re in the wrong with their back up against the wall. Expecting an unreasonable person to suddenly act reasonably in the face of mounting sanctions and considerable diplomatic pressure is beyond foolish. If there is any chance of negotiating a successful, lasting end to this conflict, Putin needs both an off ramp and an ally to facilitate it. The sieges in Ukraine aren’t getting any less siege like.
Zelensky has indicated he’s willing to talk to Putin, face to face. He has the support of the West behind him to do so; Putin does not. If this war is to end, it will take more than Putin, alone. Putin needs support on his side too; he needs a bro.
For Dan.
All views contained within are the authors only.